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Universal Adversarial Perturbations
for CNN Classifiers in EEG-Based BCIs
Zihan Liu, Xiao Zhang, Lubin Meng and Dongrui Wu
Abstract—Multiple convolutional neural network (CNN) classi-
fiers have been proposed for electroencephalogram (EEG) based
brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). However, CNN models have
been found vulnerable to universal adversarial perturbations
(UAPs), which are small and example-independent, yet powerful
enough to degrade the performance of a CNN model, when
added to a benign example. This paper proposes a novel total
loss minimization (TLM) approach to generate UAPs for EEG-
based BCIs. Experimental results demonstrated the effectiveness
of TLM on three popular CNN classifiers for both target and
non-target attacks. We also verified the transferability of UAPs
in EEG-based BCI systems. To our knowledge, this is the first
study on UAPs of CNN classifiers in EEG-based BCIs, and also
the first study on optimization based UAPs for target attacks.
UAPs are easy to construct, and can attack BCIs in real-time,
exposing a potentially critical security concern of BCIs.
Index Terms—Brain-computer interface, convolutional neural
network, electroencephalogram, universal adversarial perturba-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
A brain-computer interface (BCI) enables people to interact
directly with a computer using brain signals. Due to its low-
cost and convenience, electroencephalogram (EEG), which
records the brain’s electrical activities from the scalp, has
become the most widely used input signal in BCIs. There
are several popular paradigms in EEG-based BCIs, e.g., P300
evoked potentials [1]–[4], motor imagery (MI) [5], steady-state
visual evoked potentials [6], etc.
Deep learning, which eliminates manual feature engineer-
ing, has become increasingly popular in decoding EEG sig-
nals in BCIs. Multiple convolutional neural network (CNN)
classifiers have been proposed for EEG-based BCIs. Lawhern
et al. [7] proposed EEGNet, a compact CNN model demon-
strating promising performance in several EEG-based BCI
tasks. Schirrmeister et al. [8] proposed a deep CNN model
(DeepCNN) and a shallow CNN model (ShallowCNN) for
EEG classification. There were also studies that converted
EEG signals to spectrograms or topoplots and then fed them
into deep learning classifiers [9]–[11]. This paper focuses on
CNN classifiers which take raw EEG signals as the input,
but our approach should also be extendable to other forms of
inputs.
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Albeit their promising performance, it was found that deep
learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [12],
[13], in which deliberately designed tiny perturbations can
significantly degrade the model performance. Many success-
ful adversarial attacks have been reported in image classi-
fication [14]–[17], speech recognition [18], malware detec-
tion [19], etc.
According to the purpose of the attacker, adversarial attacks
can be categorized into two types: non-target attacks and target
attacks. In a non-target attack, the attacker wants the model
output to an adversarial example (after adding the adversarial
perturbation) to be wrong, but does not force it into a particular
class. Two typical non-target attack approaches are Deep-
Fool [20] and universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) [21].
In a target attack, the model output to an adversarial example
should always be biased into a specific wrong class. Some
typical target attack approaches are the iterative least-likely
class method [15], adversarial transformation networks [22],
and projected gradient descent (PGD) [23]. There are also
approaches that can be used in both non-target and target
attacks, e.g., L-BFGS [12], the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [14], the C&W method [24], the basic iterative
method [15], etc.
In many practical BCI systems, EEG signals are sent from
the EEG headset through wires or wirelessly to a computer,
a smart phone, or the cloud, for analysis. Thus, an attacker
can tamper with the EEG signals before or during their
transmission, e.g., attaching a jamming module to the EEG
headset signal transmitter, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Attacking an EEG-based BCI system.
Zhang and Wu [25] were the first to discover that adversarial
examples also exist in EEG-based BCI systems. They success-
fully attacked three CNN classifiers (EEGNet, DeepCNN, and
ShallowCNN) in three different scenarios (white-box, gray-
box, and black-box). Their results exposed a critical security
2problem in EEG-based BCIs, which had not been investigated
before. As pointed out in [25], “EEG-based BCIs could be
used to control wheelchairs or exoskeleton for the disabled
[26], where adversarial attacks could make the wheelchair
or exoskeleton malfunction. The consequence could range
from merely user confusion and frustration, to significantly
reducing the user’s quality of life, and even to hurting the
user by driving him/her into danger on purpose. In clinical
applications of BCIs in awareness evaluation/detection for
disorder of consciousness patients [26], adversarial attacks
could lead to misdiagnosis.”
Albeit their success, Zhang and Wu’s approaches [25] had
the following limitations:
1) An adversarial perturbation needs to be computed specif-
ically for each input EEG trial, which is inconvenient.
2) To compute the adversarial perturbation, the attacker
needs to wait for the complete EEG trial to be collected;
however, by that time the EEG trial has gone, and the
perturbation cannot be actually added to it. So, Zhang
and Wu’s approaches are theoretically important, but
may not be easily implementable in practice. For better
practicability, we should be able to perform the attack
as soon as an EEG trial starts.
This paper introduces UAP for BCIs, which is a universal
perturbation template computed offline and added to any EEG
trial in real-time. Compared with Zhang and Wu’s approaches
[25], it has two advantages: 1) a UAP is computed once
and applicable to any EEG trial, instead of being computed
specifically for each input EEG trial; and, 2) a UAP can be
added as soon as an EEG trial starts, or anywhere during an
EEG trial, thus the attacker does not need to know the number
of EEG channels, and the starting time and length of a trial. So,
it relieves the above two limitations simultaneously, making
the attack more practical.
Studies on UAPs appeared in the literature very recently.
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [21] discovered the existence of
UAPs, and verified that they can fool state-of-the-art machine
learning models in image classification. Their method for
crafting the UAPs, based on DeepFool [20], solves a com-
plex optimization problem. The same idea was later used in
attacking speech recognition systems [27]. Behjati et al. [28]
proposed a gradient projection based approach for generating
UAPs in text classification. Mopuri et al. [29] proposed a
generalizable and data-free approach for crafting UAPs, which
is independent of the underlying task. All these approaches
were for non-target attacks. Target attacks using UAPs are
more challenging, because the perturbation needs to be both
universal and targeting at a particular class. To our knowl-
edge, the only study on UAPs for target attacks was [30],
where Hirano et al. integrated a simple iterative method for
generating non-target UAPs and FGSM for target attacks to
generate UAPs for target attacks.
This paper investigates UAPs in EEG-based BCIs. We make
the following three contributions:
1) To our knowledge, this is the first study on UAPs for
EEG-based BCIs, which make adversarial attacks in
BCIs more convenient and more practical.
2) We propose a novel total loss minimization (TLM)
approach for generating a UAP for EEG trials, which
can achieve better attack performance with a smaller
perturbation, compared with the traditional DeepFool
based approach.
3) Our proposed TLM can perform both non-target attacks
and target attacks. To our knowledge, no one has studied
optimization based UAPs for target attacks before.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces two approaches to generate UAPs for EEG
trials. Section III describes our experimental setting. Sec-
tions IV and V present the experimental results on non-target
attacks and target attacks, respectively. Finally, Section VI
draws conclusions and points out several future research
directions.
II. UNIVERSAL ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATIONS (UAPS)
This section first introduces an iterative algorithm for craft-
ing a UAP for EEG trials, then presents the details of our
proposed TLM approach. All source code can be downloaded
at https://github.com/ZihanLiu95/UAP EEG.
We distinguish between two types of attacks:
• Target attacks, in which the attacker wants all adversarial
examples to be classified into a specific class. For exam-
ple, for 3-class MI (left-hand, right-hand, and feet), the
attacker may want all left-hand and right-hand adversarial
trials to be misclassified as feet trials.
• Non-target attacks, in which the attacker wants the ad-
versarial examples to be misclassified, but does not care
which class they are classified into. In the above example,
a left-hand adversarial trial could be misclassified as a
right-hand trial, or a feet trial.
A. Problem Setup
To attack a BCI system, the adversarial perturbations need
to be added to benign EEG signals in real-time.
Let Xi ∈ RC×T be the i-th raw EEG trial (i = 1, ..., n),
where C is the number of EEG channels and T the number
of time domain samples. Let x ∈ RC·T×1 be the vector form
of Xi, which concatenates all columns of Xi into a single
column. Let k(xi) be the estimated label from the target CNN
model, v ∈ RCT˙×1 be the UAP, and x˜i = xi + v be the
adversarial EEG trial after adding the UAP. Then, v needs to
satisfy:
1
n
∑n
i=1 I (k(xi + v) 6= k(xi)) ≥ δ
‖v‖p ≤ ξ
}
, (1)
where ‖ · ‖p is the Lp norm, and I(·) is the indicator function
which equals 1 if its argument is true, and 0 otherwise. The
parameter δ ∈ (0, 1] determines the desired attack success rate
(ASR), and ξ constrains the magnitude of v. Briefly speaking,
the first constraint requires the UAP to achieve a desired ASR,
and the second constraint ensures the UAP is small.
Next, we describe how a UAP can be crafted for EEG
data. We first introduce DeepFool [20], a white-box attack
(the attacker has access to all information of the victim model,
including its architecture and parameters) approach for crafting
3an adversarial perturbation for a single input example, and then
extend it to crafting a UAP for multiple examples. Finally, we
propose a novel TLM approach to craft UAP, which can be
applied to both non-target attacks and target attacks.
B. DeepFool-Based UAP
DeepFool is an approach for crafting an adversarial pertur-
bation for a single input example.
Consider a binary classification problem, where the labels
are {−1, 1}. Let x be an input example, and f an affine
classification function f(x) = wTx + b. Then, the pre-
dicted label is k(x) = signf(x). The minimal adversarial
perturbation r∗ should move x to the decision hyperplane
F = {x∗ : wTx∗ + b = 0}, i.e.,
r
∗ = −
f(x)
‖w‖22
w. (2)
CNN classifiers are nonlinear. So, an iterative procedure
[20] is used to identify the adversarial perturbation, by treating
f approximately linear around xt at Iteration t. Then, the
minimal perturbation at Iteration t is computed as:
min
rt
‖rt‖, s.t. f(xt) +∇f(xt)
T
rt = 0. (3)
The perturbation rt at Iteration t is computed using the
closed-form solution in (2), and then xt+1 = xt + rt is used
in the next iteration. The iteration stops when xt+1 starts to
change the classification label. The pseudocode is given in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: DeepFool [20] for generating an adversarial
perturbation for a single input example.
Input: x, an input example;
f , the classification function.
Output: r∗, the adversarial perturbation.
x0 = x;
t = 0;
while signf(xt) = signf(x0) do
rt = −
f(xt)
‖∇f(xt)‖22
∇f(xt);
xt+1 = xt + rt;
t = t+ 1;
end
r
∗ =
∑t
i=0 ri.
Algorithm 1 can be extended to multi-class classification by
using the one-versus-all scheme to find the closest hyperplane.
Experiments in [20] demonstrated that DeepFool can achieve
comparable attack performance as FGSM [14], but the mag-
nitude of the perturbation is smaller, which is more desirable.
UAPs were recently discovered in image classification by
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [21], who showed that a fixed ad-
versarial perturbation can fool multiple state-of-the-art CNN
classifiers on multiple images. They developed a DeepFool-
based iterative algorithm to craft the UAP, which satisfies (1).
A UAP is designed by proceeding iteratively over all examples
in the dataset X = {xi}ni=1. In each iteration, DeepFool is
used to compute a minimum perturbation △vi for the current
perturbed point xi + v, and then △vi is aggregated into v.
More specifically, if the current universal perturbation v
cannot fool the classifier on xi, then a minimum extra per-
turbation △vi that can fool xi is computed by solving the
following optimization problem:
min
△vi
‖ △ vi‖2, s.t. k(xi + v +△vi) 6= k(xi). (4)
To ensure the constraint ‖v‖p ≤ ξ is satisfied, the updated
universal perturbation v is further projected onto the ℓp ball of
radius ξ centered at 0. The projection operator Pp,ξ is defined
as:
Pp,ξ(v) = arg min
‖v′‖p≤ξ
‖v − v′‖2. (5)
Then, the UAP can be updated by v = Pp,ξ(v +△vi) in
each iteration. This process is repeated on the entire dataset
until the maximum number of iterations is reached, or the ASR
on the perturbed dataset Xv = {xi+v}
n
i=1 exceeds the target
ASR threshold δ ∈ (0, 1], i.e.,
ASR(Xv,X) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
I (k(xi + v) 6= k(xi)) ≥ δ. (6)
The pseudo-code of the DeepFool-based algorithm is given
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: DeepFool-based algorithm for generating a
UAP [21].
Input: X = {xi}ni=1, n input examples;
k, the classifier;
ξ, the maximum ℓp norm of the UAP;
δ, the desired ASR;
M , the maximum number of iterations.
Output: v, a UAP.
v = 0;
Xv = X;
for m = 1, ...,M do
if ASR(Xv,X) < δ then
for Each xi ∈ X do
if k(xi + v) == k(xi) then
Use DeepFool to compute the minimal
perturbation △vi in (4);
Update the perturbation by (5):
v ← Pp,ξ(v +△vi);
end
end
Xv = {xi + v}ni=1;
else
Break;
end
end
Return v.
C. Our Proposed TLM-Based UAP
Different from the DeepFool-based algorithm, TLM directly
optimizes an objective function w.r.t. the UAP by batch
4gradient descent. In white-box attacks, the parameters of the
victim model are known and fixed, and hence we can view
the UAP as a variable to minimize an objective function on
the entire training set.
Specifically, we solve the following optimization problem:
min
v
Ex∼Dl(x+ v, y) + α · C(x,v), s.t.‖v‖p ≤ ξ, (7)
where l(x + v, y) is a loss function, in which y is the
(true or predicted) label of example x, C(x,v) the constraint
on the perturbation v, and α the regularization coefficient.
Our proposed approach is highly flexible, as the attacker
can choose different optimizers, loss functions, or constraints,
according to the specific task.
Our approach can be applied to both target and non-target
attacks by simply updating the loss function l.
For non-target attacks, the loss function l can be defined as:
l(x, y) = log(py(x)), (8)
where py(x) is the predicted probability corresponding to
the true label y. We could also use argmax
j
pj(x), i.e., the
predicted label, to replace y if the true label is not available.
For target attacks, we force the model to classify an adver-
sarial example into a specific class, and hence l can be defined
as:
l(x, y) = − log(py(x)), (9)
where y is the target label (which is usually different from the
true label) the attacker wants.
Note that the only difference between (8) and (9) is that
there is a minus sign in (9), because in non-target attacks we
want to minimize the predicted probability for the true class,
whereas in target attacks we want to maximize the predicted
probability for the target class.
There are also various options for the constraint function
C(x,v). In most cases, we can simply set C(x,v) as L1 or
L2 regularization on the UAP v; however, it can also be a more
sophisticated function, e.g., a metric function to detect whether
the input is an adversarial example or not. When a new metric
function for detecting adversarial examples is proposed, our
approach can also be utilized to test its reliability: we set C
as the metric function to check whether we can still find an
adversarial example. Given the diversity of metric functions,
we only consider L1 or L2 regularization in this paper. Other
metric functions and defense strategies for TLM-UAP will be
considered in our future research.
The TLM-UAP can also be simplified, e.g., the same
perturbation is designed for all EEG channels, or a mini TLM-
UAP is added to an arbitrary location of an EEG trail. The
corresponding experimental results are shown in Sections IV-B
and V.
The pseudo-code of our proposed TLM approach is given
in Algorithm 3.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS
This section introduces the experimental settings for vali-
dating the performance of our proposed TLM approach.
Algorithm 3: The proposed TLM approach for generating
a UAP.
Input: Xtrain = {xtrain,i}ni=1, n training examples;
Xval = {xval,i}mi=1, m validation examples;
k, the classifier;
ξ, the maximum ℓp norm of the UAP;
α, the regularization coefficient;
δ, the desired ASR;
M , the maximum number of epochs;
Output: vbest, a UAP.
v = 0;
r = 0;
for m = 1, ...,M do
for Each mini-batch D ∈ Xtrain do
Update v in (7) for D with an optimizer;
Constrain v by (5): v ← Pp,ξ(v);
end
Xval,v = {xval,i + v}ni=1;
if ASR(Xval,v ,Xval) > r then
r = ASR(Xval,v,Xval);
vbest = v;
end
if r > δ then
Break;
end
end
Return vbest.
A. The Three BCI Datasets
The following three BCI datasets were used in our experi-
ments, as in [25], [31]:
P300 evoked potentials (P300): The P300 dataset, first
introduced in [32], contained eight subjects. In the experiment,
each subject faced a laptop on which six images were flashed
randomly to elicit P300 responses. The goal was to classify
whether the image was a target or non-target. The 32-channel
EEG data was downsampled to 256Hz, bandpass filtered to
[1, 40] Hz, and epoched to [0, 1]s after each image onset.
Then, we normalized the data using
x−mean(x)
10 , and clipped
the resulting values to [−5, 5]. Each subject had about 3,300
trials.
Feedback error-related negativity (ERN): The ERN
dataset [33] was used in a Kaggle challenge1. The EEG signals
were collected from 26 subjects and consisted of two classes
(bad-feedback and good-feedback). The entire dataset was
partitioned into a training set (16 subjects) and a test set (10
subjects). We used all 26 subjects in the experiments. The 56-
channel EEG signals were downsampled to 200Hz, bandpass
filtered to [1, 40]Hz, epoched to [0, 1.3]s after each stimulus,
and z-normalized. Each subject had 340 trials.
Motor imagery (MI): The MI dataset was Dataset 2A2 in
BCI Competition IV [34]. The EEG signals were collected
from nine subjects and consisted of four classes: the imagined
movements of the left hand, right hand, both feet, and tongue.
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/inria-bci-challenge
2http://www.bbci.de/competition/iv/
5The 22-channel EEG signals were downsampled to 128Hz,
bandpass filtered to [4, 40]Hz, epoched to [0, 2]s after each
imagination prompt, and standardized using an exponential
moving average window with a decay factor of 0.999, as in
[7]. Each subject had 576 trials, with 144 in each class.
B. The Three CNN Models
The following three CNN models were used in our experi-
ments, as in [25], [31]:
EEGNet: EEGNet [7] is a compact CNN architecture for
EEG-based BCIs. It consists of two convolutional blocks and
a classification block. To reduce the number of model parame-
ters, EEGNet uses depthwise and separable convolutions [35]
instead of traditional convolutions.
DeepCNN: DeepCNN [8] consists of four convolutional
blocks and a softmax layer for classification, which is deeper
than EEGNet. Its first convolutional block is specially designed
to handle EEG inputs, and the other three are standard con-
volutional blocks.
ShallowCNN: Inspired by filter bank common spatial pat-
terns [36], ShallowCNN [8] is specifically tailored to decode
band power features. Compared with DeepCNN, ShallowCNN
uses a larger kernel in temporal convolution, and then a
spatial filter, squaring nonlinearity, a mean pooling layer and
logarithmic activation function.
C. The Two Experimental Settings
We considered two experimental settings:
Within-subject experiments: Within-subject 5-fold cross-
validation was used in the experiments. For each individual
subject, all EEG trials were divided into 5 non-overlapping
blocks. Three blocks were selected for training, one for
validation, and the remaining one for test. We made sure each
block was used in test once, and reported the average results.
Cross-subject experiments: For each dataset, leave-one-
subject-out cross-validation was performed. Assume a dataset
had N subjects, and the N -th subject was selected as the
test subject. In training, trials from the first N − 1 subjects
were mixed, and divided into 75% for training and 25% for
validation in early stopping.
When training the victim models on the first two datasets,
we applied weights to different classes to accommodate the
class imbalance, according to the inverse of its proportion
in the training set. We used the cross entropy loss function
and Adam optimizer [37]. Early stopping was used to reduce
overfitting.
The parameters for generating DF-UAP and TLM-UAP are
shown in Table I. It should be noted that TLM-UAP was
trained with no constraint, and we set δ to 1.0 and used early
stopping (patience=10) to decide whether to stop the iteration
or not. We also replaced the true labels with the predicted
ones, as in real-world applications we do not have the true
labels.
D. The Two Performance Measures
Both raw classification accuracy (RCA) and balanced clas-
sification accuracy (BCA) [3] were used as the performance
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR GENERATING DF-UAP AND TLM-UAP. ‖v‖∞ WAS
USED IN COMPUTING THE NORM OF THE UAPS.
ξ δ M α Constraint
DF-UAP 0.2 0.8 10 - -
TLM-UAP 0.2 1.0 500 0 No
measures. The RCA is the ratio of the number of correctly
classified samples to the number of total samples, and the BCA
is the average of the individual RCAs of different classes.
The BCA is necessary, because some BCI paradigms (e.g.,
P300) have intrinsic significant class imbalance, and hence
using RCA alone may be misleading sometimes.
IV. NON-TARGET ATTACK RESULTS
This section presents the experimental results in non-target
attacks on the three BCI datasets. Recall that a non-target
attack forces a model to misclassify an adversarial example
to any class, instead of a specific class.
For notation convenience, we denote the UAP generated by
the DeepFool-based algorithm (Algorithm 2) as DF-UAP, and
the UAP generated by the proposed TLM (Algorithm 3) as
TLM-UAP.
A. Baseline Performances
We compared the UAP attack performance with two base-
lines:
1) Clean Baseline: We evaluated the baseline performances
of the three CNN models on the clean (unperturbed) EEG data,
as shown in the first part of Table II. For all three datasets
and all three classifiers, generally RCAs and BCAs of the
within-subject experiments were higher than their counterparts
in the cross-subject experiments, which is reasonable, since
individual differences cause inconsistency among EEG trials
from different subjects.
2) Noisy Baseline: We added clipped Gaussian random
noise ξ ·max(−1,min(1,N (0, 1))) to the original EEG data.
If the random noise under the same magnitude constraint can
significantly degrade the classification performance, then there
is no need to compute a UAP. The results are shown in Table II.
Random noise did not degrade the classification performance
in most cases, except sometimes on the MI dataset. This
suggests that the three CNN classifiers are generally robust
to random noise, therefore we should deliberately design the
adversarial perturbations.
B. White-Box Non-target Attack Performances
First consider white-box attacks, where we have access to
all information of the victim model, including its architecture
and parameters. The performances of DF-UAP and TLM-UAP
in white-box non-target attacks are shown in the second part of
Table II. We also performed non-parametric Mann-Whitney U
tests [38] on the RCAs (BCAs) of DF-UAP and TLM-UAP to
check if there were statistically significant differences between
them (marked with ‘*’; p < 0.01). Observe that:
6TABLE II
RCAS AND BCAS OF THE THREE CNN CLASSIFIERS IN DIFFERENT NON-TARGET ATTACK SCENARIOS ON THE THREE DATASETS (ξ = 0.2). FOR EACH
ATTACK TYPE ON EACH CNN MODEL AND EACH DATASET, THE BEST PERFORMANCES ARE MARKED IN BOLD. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANTLY
DIFFERENT RCAS/BCAS BETWEEN DF-UAP AND TLM-UAP WERE MARKED WITH ‘*’ (NON-PARAMETRICMANN-WHITNEYU TEST; p < 0.01).
Experiment Dataset Victim Model
Baseline White-Box Attack Gray-Box Attack
Clean Noisy DF-UAP TLM-UAP
Substitute Model (DF-UAP) Substitute Model (TLM-UAP)
EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
P300
EEGNet .81/.79 .80/.79 .18/.51 .17∗/.50∗ .21/.52 .21/.52 .40/.62 .17∗/.20∗ .19∗/.50∗ .25∗/.54∗
DeepCNN .82/.78 .82/.78 .20/.51 .19∗/.50∗ .33/.58 .24/.53 .49/.65 .20∗/.51∗ .20∗/.51∗ .30∗/.57∗
ShallowCNN .80/.75 .80/.74 .46/.62 .20∗/.51∗ .62/.69 .56/.67 .58/.66 .44∗/.62∗ .43∗/.61∗ .29∗/.54∗
Within
ERN
EEGNet .76/.73 .69/.64 .32/.51 .30/.50 .58/.64 .56/.63 .69/.67 .45∗/.57∗ .53/.61 .62∗/.66∗
-Subject DeepCNN .69/.65 .69/.65 .44/.55 .40/.52 .65/.64 .60/.62 .66/.62 .60∗/.62∗ .59/.61 .64/.62
ShallowCNN .70/.68 .69/.67 .52/.57 .40∗/.53∗ .66/.65 .65/.65 .62/.62 .66/.66 .64/.65 .57∗/.61∗
MI
EEGNet .61/.61 .47/.48 .29/.29 .25∗/.25∗ .37/.38 .36/.36 .38/.38 .34/.34 .31∗/.31∗ .34/.34
DeepCNN .50/.50 .47/.47 .35/.35 .26∗/.26∗ .47/.47 .41/.41 .44/.44 .49/.49 .32∗/.32∗ .39/.39
ShallowCNN .74/.74 .68/.68 .29/.29 .25∗/.25∗ .55∗/.55∗ .40/.40 .32/.32 .64/.63 .35∗/.35∗ .27∗/.27∗
P300
EEGNet .68/.63 .69/.63 .19/.51 .17∗/.50∗ .22/.52 .29/.54 .27/.54 .17∗/.50∗ .17∗/.50∗ .18∗/.50∗
DeepCNN .69/.64 .70/.64 .20/.51 .18∗/.50∗ .24/.52 .22/.52 .28/.54 .18∗/.50∗ .18∗/.50∗ .18∗/.50∗
ShallowCNN .67/.62 .66/.62 .27/.54 .19∗/.50∗ .32/.55 .35/.57 .32/.55 .20∗/.51∗ .20∗/.51∗ .18∗/.50∗
Cross
ERN
EEGNet .67/.68 .67/.65 .31/.51 .29/.50∗ .53/.59 .60/.58 .43/.59 .29∗/.50∗ .31∗/.50∗ .29∗/.50∗
-Subject DeepCNN .69/.69 .71/.70 .34/.52 .31/.50 .49/.54 .41/.53 .36/.53 .29∗/.50∗ .31∗/.50∗ .29∗/.50∗
ShallowCNN .69/.69 .68/.68 .38/.55 .29∗/.50∗ .60/.63 .65/.62 .42/.56 .35∗/.54∗ .38∗/.55∗ .29∗/.50∗
MI
EEGNet .44/.44 .38/.38 .30/.30 .25∗/.25∗ .30/.30 .34/.34 .30/.30 .29/.29 .29∗/.29∗ .25∗/.25∗
DeepCNN .47/.47 .44/.44 .33/.33 .25∗/.25∗ .38/.38 .32/.32 .28/.28 .40/.40 .30/.30 .26/.26
ShallowCNN .47/.47 .43/.43 .27/.27 .25∗/.25∗ .31∗/.31∗ .26/.26 .30/.30 .35/.35 .29/.29 .26∗/.26∗
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Fig. 2. Number of EEG trials in each class (classified by EEGNet), before and after applying TLM-UAP in white-box non-target attack. a) P300; b) ERN;
and, c) MI.
1) After adding DF-UAP or TLM-UAP, both the RCAs
and the BCAs were significantly reduced, suggesting the
effectiveness of DF-UAP and TLM-UAP attacks.
2) In most cases, TLM-UAP significantly outperformed
DF-UAP.
3) The BCAs of the P300 and ERN datasets were close
to 0.5 after DF-UAP or TLM-UAP attacks, whereas the
RCAs were lower than 0.5, implying that most test EEG
trials were classified into the minority class to achieve
the best attack performance.
Fig. 2 shows the number of EEG trials in each class on the
three datasets, classified by EEGNet before and after applying
TLM-UAP. Generally, the trials originally classified into the
majority class were misclassified into the minority class after
applying TLM-UAP. This is reasonable. Assume the minority
class contains p% (p < 50) of the trials. Then, misclassifying
all minority class trials into the majority class gives an ASR
of p%, whereas misclassifying all majority class trials into the
minority class gives an ASR of (100−p)%. Clearly, the latter
is larger.
An example of the EEG trial before and after applying
TLM-UAP is shown in Fig. 3. The TLM-UAP was so small
that it is barely visible, and hence difficult to detect.
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Fig. 3. An example of the EEG trial before and after the white-box non-target
TLM-UAP attack on the MI dataset (ξ = 0.2).
We also investigated an easily implementable channel-
7invariant TLM-UAP attack, which added the same perturbation
to all EEG channels. The white-box attack results are shown
in Table III. Compared with the clean and noisy baselines in
Table II, the RCAs and BCAs in Table III are smaller, i.e.,
the attacks were effective; however, the attack performances
were worse than those of DF-UAP and TLM-UAP in Table II,
which is intuitive, as the channel-invariant TLM-UAP had
more constraints.
TABLE III
RCAS AND BCAS OF THE THREE CNN CLASSIFIERS AFTER
CHANNEL-INVARIANT TLM-UAP ATTACKS ON THE THREE DATASETS
(ξ = 0.2).
Experiment Dataset Victim Model
Channel-invariant
TLM-UAP
P300
EEGNet .47/.66
DeepCNN .60/.72
ShallowCNN .64/.72
Within
ERN
EEGNet .48/.58
-Subject DeepCNN .53/.59
ShallowCNN .56/.61
MI
EEGNet .36/.37
DeepCNN .52/.51
ShallowCNN .74/.74
P300
EEGNet .36/.57
DeepCNN .40/.58
ShallowCNN .49/.61
Cross
ERN
EEGNet .53/.62
-Subject DeepCNN .46/.56
ShallowCNN .57/.61
MI
EEGNet .33/.33
DeepCNN .33/.33
ShallowCNN .38/.38
C. Transferability of UAP in Gray-Box Attacks
Transferability is one of the most threatening properties of
adversarial examples, which means that adversarial examples
generated by one model may also be able to attack another
one. This section explores the transferability of DF-UAP and
TLM-UAP.
A gray-box attack scenario was considered: the attacker
only has access to the training set of the victim model, instead
of its architecture and parameters. In this situation, the attacker
can train a substitute model on the same training set to generate
a UAP, which was then used to attack the victim model. The
results are shown in the last part of Table II. We can observe
that:
1) The classification performances degraded after gray-box
attacks, verifying the transferability of both DF-UAP and
TLM-UAP.
2) In most cases, TLM-UAP led to larger classification
performance degradation of the RCA and BCA than DF-
UAP, suggesting that our proposed TLM-UAP was more
effective than DF-UAP.
D. Characteristics of UAP
Additional experiments were performed in this subsection
to analyze the characteristics of TLM-UAP.
1) Signal-to-Perturbation Ratio (SPR): We computed SPRs
of the perturbed EEG trials, including applying random noise,
DF-UAP and TLM-UAP in white-box attacks. We treated the
original EEG trials as clean signals, and computed the SPRs in
cross-subject experiments. The results are shown in Table IV.
In most cases, the SPRs of the adversarial examples perturbed
by TLM-UAP were higher than those perturbed by DF-UAP,
i.e., the UAP crafted by TLM had a smaller magnitude, and
hence may be more difficult to detect. This is because in
addition to ‖v‖p ≤ ξ, TLM-UAP is also bounded by the
constraint function C(x,v) in (7).
TABLE IV
SPRS (DB) OF EEG TRIALS PERTURBED BY DF-UAP AND TLM-UAP IN
WHITE-BOX NON-TARGET ATTACKS (ξ = 0.2).
Dataset EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
P300 16.99 17.00 17.85
DF-UAP ERN 16.22 16.73 17.73
MI 21.71 13.08 14.57
P300 21.17 19.92 20.58
TLM-UAP ERN 21.03 21.67 17.72
MI 23.48 17.85 17.80
2) Spectrogram: In order to analyze the time-frequency
characteristics of UAP, we compared the spectrograms of DF-
UAP and TLM-UAP for the three classifiers in white-box
attacks. The results are shown in Fig. 4.
DF-UAPs and TLM-UAPs share similar spectrogram pat-
terns: for EEGNet and DeepCNN, the energy was mainly
concentrated in the low-frequency areas, whereas it was more
scattered for ShallowCNN. There were also some significant
differences. For EEGNet, the energy of DF-UAP was con-
centrated in [0.1, 0.9]s and [0, 7]Hz, whereas the energy of
TLM-UAP was concentrated in [0.1, 0.8]s and [3, 8]Hz. For
DeepCNN, TLM-UAP seemed to affect a longer period of
signals, i.e., [0.4, 0.8]s. For ShallowCNN, TLM-UAP mainly
perturbed the high-frequency areas, which were less uniform
than DF-UAP.
These results also explained the cross-subject transferability
results of TLM-UAP on the P300 dataset in Table II: TLM-
UAPs generated from EEGNet and DeepCNN were more
similar than those from ShallowCNN, so TLM-UAP generated
from EEGNet (DeepCNN) was more effective in attacking
DeepCNN (EEGNet), and their RCAs and BCAs were close.
E. Hyper-Parameter Sensitivity
This subsection analyzes the sensitivity of TLM-UAP to its
hyper-parameters.
1) The Magnitude of TLM-UAP: ξ is an important parame-
ter in Algorithm 3, which directly bounds the magnitude of the
perturbation. We evaluated the TLM-UAP attack performance
with respect to different ξ. As shown in Fig. 5, the RCA
decreased rapidly as ξ increased and converged at ξ = 0.2 in
most cases, suggesting that a small UAP is powerful enough
to attack the victim model.
2) Training Set Size: It’s interesting to study if the training
set size affects the performance of TLM-UAP. Fig. 6 shows the
white-box non-target attack performance of TLM-UAP, which
8(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Spectrograms of DF-UAPs and TLM-UAPs on the P300 dataset in white-box non-target within-subject experiments. Channel Cz was used. (a)
DF-UAP; (b) TLM-UAP.
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Fig. 5. RCAs of the victim model after white-box non-target within-subject TLM-UAP attack, with respect to different ξ. (a) P300 dataset; (b) ERN dataset;
and, (c) MI dataset.
were trained with different numbers of EEG trials in cross-
subject experiments on the MI dataset. It seems that we do
not need a large training set to obtain an effective TLM-UAP.
The same phenomenon was also observed in [21].
3) Constraint: We also compared different constraint C
in (7): No constraint, L1 regularization (α = 10/10/5 for
EEGNet/DeepCNN/ShallowCNN), and L2 regularization (α =
100). The SPRs on the three datasets are shown in Table V.
Albeit similar attack performances, TLM-UAP trained with
constraints led to a larger SPR (the SPRs in the ‘L1’ and ‘L2’
rows are larger than those in the corresponding ‘No’ row).
Fig. 7 shows that adding different constraints significantly
changed the waveforms of TLM-UAP. L1 regularization intro-
duced sparsity, whereas L2 regularization reduced the pertur-
TABLE V
MEAN RCAS (%) AND SPRS (DB) ON THE THREE DATASETS USING
DIFFERENT CONSTRAINTS IN WHITE-BOX NON-TARGET ATTACKS
(ξ = 0.2).
Dataset Constraint Mean RCA
SPR of TLM-UAP
EEGNet DeepCNN ShallowCNN
P300
No 17.18 14.89 14.71 14.45
L1 17.36 18.39 17.82 17.16
L2 17.85 21.17 19.92 20.58
ERN
No 30.96 19.91 20.70 17.02
L1 29.24 21.45 22.05 17.11
L2 30.66 21.03 21.67 17.72
MI
No 25.05 22.88 15.46 16.11
L1 25.08 23.35 53.76 16.88
L2 25.06 23.48 17.85 17.80
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Fig. 6. ASRs in white-box non-target cross-subject experiment on the MI
dataset, with respect to different training set sizes. ‘All’ means all 4,608
training EEG trials in the MI dataset were used in Algorithm 3.
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Fig. 7. TLM-UAP trained with different constraints on the MI dataset in
white-box non-target attacks. Channels Pz , Cz and Fz were used.
We may also generate a TLM-UAP which satisfies other
requirements by changing the constraint function C, such as
perturbing certain EEG channels, or even against a metric
function which is used to detect adversarial examples. We will
leave these to our future research.
V. TARGET ATTACK RESULTS
Our TLM approach is also capable of performing target
attacks, which can be easily achieved by changing the loss
function l in (7).
We performed white-box target attacks in cross-subject
experiments on the three datasets and evaluated the target
rate, which is the number of samples classified to the target
class divided by the number of total samples. The results are
shown in Table VI. TLM-UAPs had close to 100% target rates
in white-box target attacks, indicating that our approach can
manipulate the BCI systems to output whatever the attacker
wants, which may be more dangerous than non-target attacks.
For example, in a BCI-driven wheelchair, a target TLM-UAP
attack may force all commands to be interpreted as a specific
command (e.g., going forward), and hence run the user into
danger.
TABLE VI
TARGET RATES OF THE THREE CNN CLASSIFIERS IN CROSS-SUBJECT
WHITE-BOX TARGET TLM-UAP ATTACKS ON THE THREE DATASETS
(ξ = 0.2).
Dataset Victim Model Target Class
Baseline TLM-UAP
Clean Noisy Attack
P300
EEGNet
Non-target .6627 .6463 .9629
Target .3373 .3510 .9572
DeepCNN
Non-target .6755 .6637 .9416
Target .3245 .3116 .9373
ShallowCNN
Non-target .6505 .6597 .8904
Target .3495 .3499 .8306
ERN
EEGNet
Bad .3537 .3741 .9980
Good .6463 .6300 .9971
DeepCNN
Bad .3770 .3309 .9912
Good .6230 .6739 .9976
ShallowCNN
Bad .3033 .2910 .9741
Good .6967 .7160 .9888
MI
EEGNet
Left .3152 .1350 .9821
Right .2830 .2056 .9850
Feet .1545 .1954 .9994
Tongue .2473 .5380 1.000
DeepCNN
Left .2535 .1765 .8839
Right .3491 .2207 .9238
Feet .2282 .3155 .9659
Tongue .1692 .2544 .9938
ShallowCNN
Left .2872 .1952 .9151
Right .2537 .1746 .9443
Feet .2647 .2838 .9819
Tongue .2124 .3673 .9983
To our knowledge, no one has studied optimization based
UAPs for target attacks before. Our TLM approach is the first
in this direction.
To further simplify the implementation of TLM-UAP, we
also considered smaller template size, i.e., mini TLM-UAP
with a small number of channels and time domain samples,
which can be added anywhere to an EEG trail. Mini TLM-
UAPs are more practical and flexible, because they do not
require the attacker to know the exact number of EEG channels
and the exact length and starting time of an EEG trial.
During optimization, we randomly placed the mini TLM-UAP
at different locations (both channel-wise and time-wise) of
EEG trials and tried to make the attacks successful. During
test, the mini TLM-UAP was randomly added to 30 different
locations of each EEG trail. The results are shown in Fig. 8.
Generally, all mini TLM-UAPs were effective. However, their
effectiveness decreased when the number of used channels
(Cm) and/or the template length (Tm) decreased, which is
intuitive. These results suggest that a mini TLM-UAP may
be used to achieve a better compromise between the attack
performance and the implementation difficulty.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Multiple CNN classifiers have been proposed for EEG-
based BCIs. However, CNN models are vulnerable to UAPs,
which are small and example-independent perturbations, yet
powerful enough to significantly degrade the performance of
a CNN model when added to a benign example. This paper
has proposed a novel TLM approach to generate UAP for
EEG-based BCI systems. Experimental results demonstrated
its effectiveness in attacking three popular CNN classifiers
for both non-target and target attacks. We also verified the
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Fig. 8. Target rates of cross-subject mini TLM-UAP target attacks, with different UAP template size (Cm, Tm), where Cm is the number of EEG channels
and Tm the number of time domain samples. The original trial sizes of P300/ERN/MI datasets were (32, 256)/(56, 260)/(22, 256), respectively. (a) P300
dataset, non-target class; (b) ERN dataset, bad-feedback class; (c) MI dataset, left-hand class.
transferability of the UAPs in EEG-based BCI systems. To our
knowledge, this is the first study on UAPs of CNN classifiers
in EEG-based BCIs, and also the first study on UAPs for target
attacks. It exposes a potentially critical security problem in
BCIs, and hopefully will lead to the design of safer BCIs.
Our future research will enhance the transferability of
TLM-UAP in deep learning, and also consider how to attack
traditional machine learning models in EEG-based BCIs. More
importantly, we will design effective strategies to defend
against UAP attacks. Multiple approaches, e.g., adversarial
training [14], defensive distillation [39], ensemble adversarial
training [40], and so on [23], [41]–[43], have been proposed
to defend against adversarial examples in other application
domains. As TLM is a perturbation based first-order gradient
optimization approach, PGD [23] training may be used to
defend against it.
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